ISBN 9783843940061

978-3-8439-4006-1, Reihe Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Gian-Marco Kokott
Equilibrium Bidding in Ex-Post Split-Award Auctions

169 Seiten, Dissertation Technische Universität München (2018), Softcover, A5

Zusammenfassung / Abstract

Split-award auctions are reverse auctions, in which the auctioneer splits the whole business into multiple shares. In this thesis, several combinatorial and non-combinatorial ex-post split-award auction formats are analyzed in a setting with diseconomies of scale and in another environment with economies of scale. Motivated by procurement practice, the auction formats discussed include a first-price sealed-bid split-award auction and various Dutch formats. The theoretical analysis highlights the strategic differences and similarities of these formats by deriving Bayesian Nash equilibria for the static as well as perfect Bayesian equilibria for the dynamic auction formats. Furthermore, the efficiency and procurement costs of these auctions are compared. The experimental analysis supports the theoretical results.