ISBN 978-3-8439-3799-3

978-3-8439-3799-3, Reihe Informationstechnik

Hermann Zeno Seuschek
High-Level Side-Channel Leakage Models with Application to Compilers

144 Seiten, Dissertation Technische Universität München (2018), Softcover, A5

Zusammenfassung / Abstract

Side-channel attacks allow the extraction of secret keys from implementations of cryptographic algorithms. A typical solution to prevent this kind of attacks is the application of masking countermeasures to split secrets into multiple shares. To be effective, a strict separation of the shares is required during processing. Due to the leakage characteristics of the underlying hardware, this requirement is very challenging in practice. This thesis introduces a novel high-level side-channel leakage model of CPUs to instruct code generators to emit assembly code with the necessary separation of shares.